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1 Introduction   
Two important ways of improving the technological level of an economy are research 
and development (R&D) and technology licensing. As technology licensing is usually 
less expensive way of improving technological quality compared to indigenous R&D, 
many countries are encouraging their firms to engage in technology licensing and 
improving their technological quality. 
However, it has been found that, in case of process innovation
1, technology 
licensing may reduce social welfare. Kabiraj and Marjit (1992) and Lin (1996) have 
argued that licensing can reduce welfare if cost reduction of a firm induces some firms 
to exit the market or if licensing facilitates collusion. Therefore, technology licensing 
can reduce social welfare by increasing market concentration. 
In this paper we provide another reason for lower social welfare under 
technology licensing. More specifically, we argue that the possibility of licensing may 
reduce social welfare by discouraging firm to do cooperative R&D. Thus, we show that 
the presence of technology licensing can reduce social welfare even if licensing does not 
induce exit of firms or does not facilitate collusion but changes R&D organization. 
Researchers have already paid large amount of attention to discuss several issues 
on R&D. One important area of research is to explain the rationale for doing 
cooperative R&D and its effect on R&D investment and social welfare (see, e.g., 
d’Aspremont and Jacquemin, 1988, Suzumura, 1992, Choi, 1993 and Hinloopen, 
1997).
2 However, previous works on R&D generally ignored the possibility of other 
business strategies such as technology licensing.
 3 Previous papers assumed that a firm 
could share its knowledge with another firm if they do R&D together but did not allow a 
firm to sell its knowledge to another firm. This assumption is reasonable in those 
industries where technology licensing is very difficult or costly. Hence, the assumption 
of the previous papers might be suitable in industries with tacit knowledge but might not 
be relevant where knowledge sharing is not difficult. 
We show that if we allow firms to increase their strategic options by making 
licensing as a feasible option along with cooperative and non-cooperative R&D then the 
incentive for knowledge sharing through cooperative R&D would be reduced. We find 
that firms would prefer to do non-cooperative R&D keeping the option for licensing 
open. Whether the possibility of licensing increases social welfare is, however, 
ambiguous. Thus, the present paper is a step to examine the impact of licensing on R&D 
organization and social welfare.  
                                                       
1 In case of process innovation, better quality of the technology implies lower cost of production for the 
corresponding firm. 
2 For papers on patent race one may refer to Loury (1979) and Lee and Wilde (1980). 
3 Two exceptions are Gallini and Winter (1985) and Katz and Shapiro (1985). In totally different context, these 
papers focus on the effect of licensing on R&D. While Gallini and Winter (1985) identify the conditions for 
licensing in a search-theoretic model of R&D, Katz and Shapiro (1985) focus on the incentives to develop a 
process when patent holder has the option for licensing its technology to the competitor.   2
Hence, this paper serves two purposes. Firstly, it shows the effect of licensing on 
R&D. Secondly, it shows that licensing may reduce welfare when the firms have the 
option for R&D before licensing. 
In what follows, section 2 considers a model of R&D competition between 
Cournot duopolists with homogeneous goods, where success in R&D is uncertain. We 
examine R&D organization and social welfare with and without the option for licensing. 
We show that, in absence of licensing, firms will do cooperative R&D when cost 
reduction from R&D is sufficiently low. While cooperation in R&D stage will increase 
the probability of using a better technology by both firms, knowledge sharing through 
R&D cooperation will also increase competition in the product market. If cost reduction 
from R&D is sufficiently small then the former effect will dominate the latter effect and 
will make cooperative R&D profitable compared to non-cooperative R&D. 
However, the possibility of unilateral success in R&D can create the possibility 
of technology licensing. In this situation, the successful firm will always prefer to 
license its technology against pre-unit output royalty. Thus, licensing will help the 
licenser to raise its profit from royalty income and also to reduce competition from the 
licensee, as optimal output royalty will not change the effective marginal cost of 
production of the licensee compared to a situation with no licensing. The possibility of 
licensing will always encourage the firms to do non-cooperative R&D keeping the 
option for licensing open.  
If cost reduction from R&D is sufficiently large then firms will do non-
cooperative R&D irrespective of the availability of licensing. In case of unilateral 
success in R&D, licensing does not change the effective marginal cost of production of 
the unsuccessful firm compared to a situation with no licensing. But, licensing increases 
profit of the successful firm through royalty income. Hence, presence of licensing 
increases social welfare when cost reduction from R&D is sufficiently large.  
If cost reduction from R&D is sufficiently small and licensing is an option then 
firms will do non-cooperative R&D. Firms will do cooperative R&D without the 
possibility of licensing. Since licensing does not change the effective marginal cost of 
the licensee compared to a situation with no licensing, licensing does not affect 
consumer surplus. But, in absence of licensing, cooperative R&D will help to reduce the 
marginal cost of production of the unsuccessful firm under unilateral success in R&D. 
Therefore, in case of unilateral success in R&D, cooperative R&D will increase 
consumer surplus compared to ‘non-cooperative R&D and licensing afterwards’. Hence, 
presence of licensing reduces social welfare when cost reduction from R&D is 
sufficiently small. However, as we will show, if possibility of licensing increases 
probability of success in R&D significantly then, even if cost reduction from R&D is 
sufficiently small, social welfare can be higher in presence of licensing. Thus, we show 
that the effect of licensing on social welfare depends on the degree of cost reduction 
from R&D and the effect of R&D investment on probability of success in R&D.   3
At this point it is worth mentioning a related result of the literature on licensing. 
Previous works on licensing argue that firms would prefer licensing with output royalty 
than fixed fee licensing (see, e.g., Gallini and Winter, 1985 and Rockett, 1990). In the 
following analysis, we will show that the cooperative R&D of this paper is similar to a 
licensing contract with fixed fee only. Hence, if licensing is not a feasible option then 
cooperative R&D helps the firms to replicate a situation similar to a licensing contract 
with fixed fee. But cooperative R&D does not help the firms to replicate a licensing 
contract with output royalty. Thus, if licensing is not allowed then it reduces the option 
to the firms and increases social welfare. 
  The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section provides a model 
with non-cooperative and cooperative R&D without the possibility of licensing. We 
extend this model in section 3 by incorporating licensing. Section 4 looks at the welfare 
implications. In section 5, we discuss the implications of endogenous R&D costs on 
social welfare. Section 6 concludes the paper. 
2  The basic model  
Consider an economy with two firms, called firm 1 and firm 2. Assume that these firms 
can produce a homogeneous product with a technology corresponding to constant 
marginal cost of production c. Both firms do R&D and each of them can reduce the 
cost of production to c. However, success in R&D is uncertain. Assume that  p  and 
) 1 ( p −  show the respective unconditional probability of success and failure in R&D. 
We assume that both firms face same probability of success in R&D. Further we assume 
that there are no other costs related to production or R&D. 
  The assumption of no costs of doing R&D will implies that both firms always 
find it profitable to do R&D compared to non-R&D. If there were costs of doing R&D, 
firms might not find it profitable to do R&D when the probability of success in R&D 
was sufficiently low. Since our purpose is to examine the impact of licensing on R&D 
organization, i.e., non-cooperative and cooperative R&D, and social welfare, we 
abstract the possibility of non-R&D by assuming no cost of doing R&D.  
Finally, assume that the inverse market demand function is given by 
 
q a P − = ,                  ( 1 )  
 
where,  P shows the price of the product, q stands for the industry output and  c a > . 
Further, throughout the analysis, we assume that  a c c − > 2 . This assumption implies 
that if one firm has a technology corresponding to marginal cost of production c and 
another firm has a technology corresponding to marginal cost of production c, the 
output of the both firms will be positive.   
  In this section we will assume that these firms do not have the option for 
licensing. Therefore, here we consider the following game. In stage 1, these firms decide  4
whether to do non-cooperative R&D or cooperative R&D. Then, in stage 2, they 
compete like Cournot duopolists in the product market. We solve the game through 
backward induction. 
Let us first consider non-cooperative R&D. Profit of the ith firm from R&D is  
 
) , ( ) 1 ( ) , ( ) 1 ( ) , ( ) 1 ( ) , ( ) (
2 2 c c p c c p p c c p p c c p NC V i i i i i π π π π − + − + − + = ,    (2) 
 
where,  2 , 1 = i  and the first (second) argument in the π function represents the marginal 
cost of production of firm 1 (firm 2).  
Now we examine the possibility of cooperative R&D by these firms. Following 
Choi (1993), we assume that, under cooperative R&D, both firms operate their own 
R&D lab but these firms will use the innovated technology if at least one of them 
succeeds in R&D.
4 Therefore, in case of cooperative R&D, profit of the ith firm, 
2 , 1 = i , is 
 
) , ( ) 1 ( ) , ( ) 1 ( ) , ( ) 1 ( ) , ( ) (
2 2 c c p c c p p c c p p c c p C V i i i i i π π π π − + − + − + = .    (3) 
 
  However, these firms will prefer to do cooperative R&D compared to non-
cooperative R&D provided neither of them is worse-off under cooperative R&D 
compared to non-cooperative R&D. So, these firms will do cooperative R&D instead of 
non-cooperative R&D provided 
 
) ( ) ( NC V C V i i >    or   ) , ( ) , ( ) , ( 2 c c c c c c i i i π π π + > .        (4)  
 
Condition (4) shows that if industry profit in case of unilateral success in R&D increases 
under cooperative R&D compared to non-cooperative R&D then firms will prefer 
cooperative R&D compared to non-cooperative R&D. Since, industry profit remains 
same in case of both-success and no-success in R&D, the determinant for cooperative or 
non-cooperative R&D becomes the industry profit under unilateral success in R&D. 
Hence, if condition (4) does not hold then firms will prefer to do non-cooperative R&D 
compared to cooperative R&D. 
  With the demand and cost specification we find that (4) holds if and only if 
 
3
) 2 5 ( a c
c
−
> .              ( 5 )  
 
Therefore, following proposition is immediate from the above discussion. 
                                                       
4 Given our assumptions on R&D, it is always optimal for the firms to operate two research labs under 
cooperative R&D.  5
Proposition 1: Firms will prefer to do cooperative R&D compared to non-cooperative 
R&D when cost reduction from R&D is not sufficiently large, i.e.,  3
) 2 5 ( a c c
− > . 
Since the choice of R&D organization depends on the amount of cost reduction 
from R&D, it is easy to understand that social welfare will also be affected with the 
amount of cost reduction. Expected welfare is given by 
) , ( ) 1 ( ) , ( ) 1 ( 2 ) , ( ) ( 0
2
0 0
2 c c W p c c W p p c c W p C EW − + − + = ,   for 
3
) 2 5 ( a c
c
−
>     (6) 
and 
) , ( ) 1 ( ) , ( ) 1 ( 2 ) , ( ) ( 0
2
0 0
2 c c W p c c W p p c c W p NC EW − + − + = ,  for
3
) 2 5 ( a c
c
−
< ,  (7) 
 
where, the argument in  (.,.) 0 W  shows the number of firms producing with cost c and 
with cost c and   (.,.) 0 W  shows the summation of industry profit and consumer surplus 
for the corresponding situation. 
3 Licensing 
In this section we extend the model of the previous section by allowing the firms to take 
decision on licensing ex-post R&D. We consider the following game. In stage 1, firms 
decide whether to do non-cooperative R&D or cooperative R&D. In stage 2, they decide 
on technology licensing. In stage 3, they compete like Cournot duopolists. We solve the 
game through backward induction.  
It is clear from our framework that licensing is not an option if firms do 
cooperative R&D since, if successful, they share the information about the new 
innovation while doing R&D. However, given non-cooperative R&D, the firms may 
have incentive for knowledge sharing ex-post R&D provided there is unilateral success 
in R&D. We assume that, if the firms do non-cooperative R&D then, in case of 
unilateral success in R&D, the successful firm has the option to give a take-it-or-leave-it 
licensing offer to the unsuccessful firm. Under licensing, the licenser can charge non-
negative up-front fixed-fee, F  and per-unit output royalty, r .
5  
  Before examining these firms’ preference over cooperative R&D and non-
cooperative R&D with the option for licensing afterwards, let us first examine the 
optimal licensing contract and payoffs of these firms. Since, these firms are symmetric, 
without loss of generality we assume that, in case of unilateral success in R&D, firm 1 
                                                       
5 One may think that the firms can make a similar contract under cooperative R&D where the contract is 
contingent upon the R&D outcome, saying that in case of unilateral success in R&D, the successful firm 
will give the technology to the unsuccessful firm but against a payment consisting of fixed fee and output 
royalty. However, if the possibility of coordination in the R&D stage under cooperative R&D helps the 
unsuccessful firm to acquire the knowledge about the new innovation then this contingent contract under 
cooperative R&D becomes ineffective.   6
succeeds in R&D and decides whether to license the technology to firm 2 or not. 
Therefore, in this situation firm 1 maximizes the following expression: 
 
) , ( 1 2
, r c c rq F Max
r F + + + π              ( 8 )  
s.t.,  ) ( ) , ( 1 1 2 c c r c c rq F + ≥ + + + π π                           (9) 
) , ( ) , ( 2 2 c c F r c c π π ≥ − +                           (10) 
and  0 ≥ F , 0 ≥ i q ,  2 , 1 = i .
6                        (11) 
 
Solution of the problem given by (8) – (11) will provide the following result.  
 
Proposition 2: If the firms do not make a cooperative contract ex-ante R&D then, in 
case of unilateral success in R&D, the successful firm will always license its technology 
to the unsuccessful firm. The licensing contract will involve only output royalty equal to 
) ( c c − . 
  Since the proof is similar to Mukherjee and balasubramanian (2001), we are 
leaving the details here. 
  Now, we are in a position to consider the optimality between cooperative R&D 
and non-cooperative R&D with the option for licensing afterwards. We should note that 
if  3
) 2 5 ( a c c
− <  then these firms will not do cooperative R&D but will do non-cooperative 
R&D followed by licensing in case of unilateral success in R&D. Hence, in this 
situation, it is trivial that firms will always prefer non-cooperative R&D with the 
possibility of licensing afterwards compared to cooperative R&D. 
But, for  3
) 2 5 ( a c c
− > , firms will prefer both cooperative R&D and ‘non-
cooperative R&D with the possibility of licensing afterwards’ compared to non-
cooperative regime. Since, profits of these firms under both-success and no-success 
remain same under cooperative R&D and ‘non-cooperative R&D with the possibility of 
licensing’, preference between cooperative agreement ex-ante R&D and ‘non-
cooperative R&D with the option for licensing’ depends on the profits of these firms in 
case of unilateral success in R&D. The ith firm will prefer ‘non-cooperative R&D with 
the option for licensing’ compared to cooperative R&D provided  
 
) , ( ) 1 ( 2 )) , ( ) , ( )( 1 (
* c c p p c c rq c c p p i i j i π π π − > + + − , 
or,   ) , ( 2 ) , ( ) , (
* c c c c rq c c i i j i π π π > + + ,                                (12) 
 
where,  2 , 1 , = j i ,  j i ≠  and 
*
j q  shows the optimal output of the  j th firm under 
licensing. Demand and cost specifications show that the condition (12) satisfies always. 
                                                       
6 Antitrust law may be responsible for non-negative constraint on licensing contract.  7
  We summarize the above discussion in the following proposition. 
 
Proposition 3: These firms always prefer non-cooperative R&D with the option for 
licensing afterwards compared to cooperative R&D.  
 
  The reason for the above result is easy to understand. If firms do cooperative 
R&D then, in case of unilateral success in R&D, the successful firm needs to share the 
knowledge with the unsuccessful firm and the successful firm faces relatively higher 
competition from the unsuccessful firm compared to a situation where the successful 
firm does not share the knowledge with the unsuccessful firm. But if firms do non-
cooperative R&D and have the option for licensing afterwards then, in case of unilateral 
success in R&D, the successful firm will always gain from licensing its technology to 
the unsuccessful firm. Here the successful firm can eliminate the possibility of higher 
competition from the unsuccessful firm by designing a suitable licensing contract. Since 
these firms are symmetric and have similar probability of being a licenser or licensee, 
both firms will always do non-cooperative R&D instead of forming a cooperative R&D 
agreement when there is a possibility of license ex-post R&D. 
One should take the result of Proposition 3 with a caution. In this paper, 
cooperative R&D only helps the firms to benefit from knowledge sharing. We have 
examined relative profitability of knowledge sharing at the time of doing R&D 
compared to knowledge sharing after getting the innovation. But, in our framework, 
there is no benefit from cost saving or synergies under cooperative R&D. If R&D 
involves fixed cost production as in Marjit (1991) then cost saving provides other 
incentive for doing cooperative R&D. As a result, firms may prefer to do R&D in one 
lab instead of operating two labs, as described in this paper.
7 The possibility of getting 
benefit from synergies as in Kabiraj and Mukherjee (2000) also provides another 
incentive for doing cooperative R&D.  With sufficiently higher incentive for getting 
benefits from cost saving or synergies under cooperative R&D, firms might do 
cooperative R&D for some parametric configurations even if they have the option for 
licensing ex-post R&D. However, even in this situation, our basic argument holds, i.e., 
the possibility of licensing ex-post R&D reduces the incentive for doing R&D. Since, 
the possibility of knowledge sharing under licensing helps the firms to increase their 
profits under non-cooperative R&D, firms have lower incentive to do cooperative R&D 
in presence of licensing ex-post R&D. 
                                                       
7 If the firms operate a single lab under cooperative R&D then the payoff of the i th firm, i = 12 , , will be 
pc c p c c ii
K ππ (,) ( ) (,) +− − 1 2 , where K  is the fixed cost of doing R&D. Hence, the firms would 
use a single lab instead of two labs under cooperative R&D provided 
)] , ( ) , ( )[ 1 ( 2 c c c c p p i i
K π π − − > .   8
  Further, it should be noted that we consider a situation where firms would make 
the licensing contract ex-post R&D. However, these firms can make the same licensing 
contract ex-ante R&D contingent on the R&D outcome.
8 For example, these firms can 
do non-cooperative R&D and make a licensing contract ex-ante R&D saying that if 
there is any technology transfer ex-post R&D then the licensee will pay an output 
royalty at a rate  ) (
* c c r − = . But, whether the firms do the licensing agreement ex-ante 
or ex-post R&D, it is clear that the firms would not do cooperative R&D when they 
have the option for knowledge sharing through technology licensing. 
  It is also worth mentioning the similarity of the cooperative R&D mentioned in 
this paper and a licensing contract with fixed fee only. If the firms make a licensing 
contract with up-front fixed fee only then both firms will produce with a marginal cost 
of production c. Further, the symmetry of these firms makes them equally likely to be a 
licenser and a licensee. Therefore, if the firms make a licensing contract with an up-
front fixed fee only then the expected payoff of the ith firm will be 
 
), , ( ) 1 ( ) ) , ( ( ) 1 ( ) ) , ( )( 1 ( ) , ( ) (
2 * * 2 c c p F c c p p F c c p p c c p LF V i i i i i π π π π − + − − + + − + =
                                ( 1 3 )  
where 
* F  is the optimal value of the fixed fee charged by the licenser. The expression 
(13) is same as the expression (3). This implies that, under cooperative R&D agreement, 
firms can replicate the licensing contract with fixed fee but cooperative R&D does not 
help the firms to replicate the licensing contract with output royalty.   
In case of unilateral success in R&D, the effective marginal cost of production of 
the unsuccessful firm is same under non-cooperative R&D with and without the 
possibility of licensing. This is because the effective marginal cost of production of the 
unsuccessful firm will be the summation of c and the per-unit output royalty  ) ( c c − . 
Therefore, in case of unilateral success in R&D, optimal output and profit of the 
unsuccessful firm will be same under non-cooperative R&D with and without licensing. 
Therefore, expected welfare under non-cooperative R&D with the possibility of 
licensing afterwards will be 
 
) , ( ) 1 ( ) , ( ) 1 ( 2 ) , ( ) ( 0
2
0
2 c c W p c c W p p c c W p NCL EW l − + − + = ,                          (14) 
 
where,  l W  shows the summation of consumer surplus and industry profit. It should be 
noted that now industry profit includes royalty payment also. We have seen that optimal 
output and profit of the unsuccessful firm will be same under non-cooperative R&D 
with and without licensing. Therefore, optimal output and profit, excluding royalty 
income, of the successful firm will be same under non-cooperative R&D with and 
                                                       
8 In a paper Scotchmer (1996) showed the benefit from ex-ante licensing contract when second generation 
product infringes patent of the first generation product.   9
without licensing. Hence, we find that  uns l q c c W W ) ( 0 − + = , where  uns q  shows the 
optimal output of the unsuccessful firm in case of unilateral success in R&D under non-
cooperative R&D. 
4 Welfare  comparison 
Now, we are in a position to compare social welfare under two regimes: one where 
firms do not have the option for licensing ex-post R&D and second, where the firms 
have the option for licensing ex-post R&D. 
Let us first consider the situation where  3
) 2 5 ( a c c
− > . In this situation, firms do 
cooperative R&D when they do not have the option for licensing ex-post R&D. In 
presence of licensing these firms will do non-cooperative R&D. Therefore, 
corresponding welfare expressions are (6) and (14). Given the demand and cost 
specifications, comparison of (6) and (14) shows that (6) is always greater than (14). 
Hence, social welfare is higher in absence of licensing when  3
) 2 5 ( a c c
− > .  
Next, consider the situation where  3
) 2 5 ( a c c
− < . Here firms will do non-
cooperative R&D irrespective of the option for licensing ex-post R&D. Therefore, here 
the corresponding expressions for welfare are (7) and (14). It is easy to understand that 
in this situation welfare is higher in presence of licensing. This is because the possibility 
of licensing does not change the optimal output decisions of these firms but, in case of 
unilateral success in R&D, licensing helps the successful firm to increase its profit from 
royalty income. 
We summarize the above discussion in the following proposition. 
Proposition 4: Consider  3
) 2 5 ( ) (
a c c
− < > . Then the possibility of licensing ex-post R&D 
reduces (increases) social welfare compared to a situation where the firms do not have 
the option for licensing ex-post R&D. 
 
5  Endogenous R&D costs 
So far we have assumed that probability of success in R&D is given exogenously. In this 
section, we will briefly discuss the situation where firms can influence the probability of 
success through their choice of R&D investment, as in Choi (1993). We will show that 
when firms can influence the probability of success in R&D then welfare can be higher 
in presence of licensing even for the situations where cooperative R&D is profitable 
than non-cooperative R&D in absence of licensing. 
  Assume that the unconditional probability of success in R&D increases with 
R&D investment, i.e.,  ) ( i x p ,  2 , 1 = i , where  i x  is firm i’s R&D investment. We 
consider that  0 ) ( > ′
i x p ,  0 ) ( < ″
i x p ,  ∞ = ′ ) 0 ( p  and  0 ) ( = ∞ ′ p  for  2 , 1 = i . Therefore,  10
expected profits of the ith firm under ‘non-cooperative R&D without licensing’, 
cooperative R&D and ‘non-cooperative R&D with licensing’ are respectively  
 
) , ( ) ( )) ( 1 ( ) , ( )) ( 1 )( ( ) , ( ) ( ) ( ) ( c c x p x p c c x p x p c c x p x p NC V i j i i j i i j i i π π π − + − + =         
    i i j i x c c x p x p − − − + ) , ( )) ( 1 ))( ( 1 ( π ,                     (15) 
 
) , ( ) ( )) ( 1 ( ) , ( )) ( 1 )( ( ) , ( ) ( ) ( ) ( c c x p x p c c x p x p c c x p x p C V i j i i j i i j i i π π π − + − + =         
  i i j i x c c x p x p − − − + ) , ( )) ( 1 ))( ( 1 ( π ,                                (16) 
and 
 
) ) , ( ))( ( 1 )( ( ) , ( ) ( ) ( ) (
*
j i j i i j i i rq c c x p x p c c x p x p NCL V + − + = π π         
      i i j i i j i x c c x p x p c c x p x p − − − + − + ) , ( )) ( 1 ))( ( 1 ( ) , ( ) ( )) ( 1 ( π π ,              (17) 
where  2 , 1 , = j i  and  i j ≠ . 
Respective first order conditions for profit maximization with respect to R&D 
invest are  
) , ( ) ( ) ( ) , ( )) ( 1 )( ( ) , ( ) ( ) ( c c x p x p c c x p x p c c x p x p i j i i j i i j i π π π ′ − − ′ + ′        
  1 ) , ( )) ( 1 )( ( = − ′ − c c x p x p i j i π ,                        (18) 
 
) , ( ) ( ) ( ) , ( )) ( 1 )( ( ) , ( ) ( ) ( c c x p x p c c x p x p c c x p x p i j i i j i i j i π π π ′ − − ′ + ′         
  1 ) , ( )) ( 1 )( ( = − ′ − c c x p x p i j i π ,                       (19) 
and 
 
) , ( ) ( ) ( ) ) , ( ))( ( 1 )( ( ) , ( ) ( ) (
* c c x p x p rq c c x p x p c c x p x p i j i j i j i i j i π π π ′ − + − ′ + ′       
1 ) , ( )) ( 1 )( ( = − ′ − c c x p x p i j i π .                                  (20) 
 
  It is easy to see that, in absence of licensing, cooperative R&D will be profitable 
compared to non-cooperative R&D if  3
) 2 5 ( a c c
− > . If  3
) 2 5 ( a c c
− =  then optimal R&D 
investments under cooperative and non-cooperative R&D are same and hence, expected 
will be same under non-cooperative and cooperative R&D. Given any positive and equal 
R&D investments of these firms, cooperative R&D will give higher expected profit 
compared to non-cooperative R&D if  3
) 2 5 ( a c c
− > . Further, if  3
) 2 5 ( a c c
− >  then optimal 
R&D investment of each firm will be more under cooperative R&D compared to non-
cooperative R&D. Hence, expected profit of these firms under cooperative R&D will be 
higher than that of under non-cooperative R&D when  3
) 2 5 ( a c c
− > . Similar argument will 
show that firms will not do cooperative R&D for  3
) 2 5 ( a c c
− < .    11
Given the values of R&D investments, left hand side of (20) is greater than the 
left hand sides of (18) and (19). Due to the symmetry of these firms, both firms will 
invest more under ‘non-cooperative R&D with licensing’ compared to cooperative R&D 
and ‘non-cooperative R&D without licensing’. Therefore, equilibrium R&D investments 
and probability of success in R&D will be highest under ‘non-cooperative R&D with the 
possibility of licensing’ compared to cooperative R&D and ‘non-cooperative R&D 
without the possibility of licensing’. 
Following the discussions of the previous section, we can say that, given the 
positive R&D investments of these firms, expected welfare would be lower under ‘non-
cooperative R&D with the possibility of licensing’ compared to cooperative R&D. 
However, we have shown that equilibrium R&D investment and probability of success 
in R&D will be higher under ‘non-cooperative R&D with the possibility of licensing’ 
compared to cooperative R&D. If benefit from higher probability of success is 
sufficiently higher then social welfare will be higher under ‘non-cooperative R&D with 
the possibility of licensing’ compared to cooperative R&D. 
Now, we will consider a specific functional form for the probability of success in 
R&D to provide an example showing higher welfare under ‘non-cooperative R&D with 
the possibility of licensing’ compared to cooperative R&D when we have endogenous 
costs of R&D. Suppose the probability function for the success in R&D faced by each of 
theses firms is given by 
2
1
) ( i i x x p µ = , 2 , 1 = i . Further, for simplicity, assume that 
1 = a ,  0 = c  and  ) , 0 ( 5
2 ∈ c .
9 Given the demand and cost specifications we find that 
probability of success in R&D under ‘non-cooperative R&D with the possibility of 
licensing’ equals to 1 for 
c c) 1 ( 2
3
− ≥ µ . Assume that 
c c) 1 ( 2
3
− = µ . For this value of µ , 
optimal total R&D investment in the economy under ‘non-cooperative R&D with 
licensing’ is  9
) 1 ( 4 c c − .  Therefore, expected welfare under ‘non-cooperative R&D with 
licensing’ is  
 
9
) ) 1 ( 1 ( 4 c c
Wl
− −
= .                                                         (21) 
 
When 
c c) 1 ( 2
3
− = µ , the probability of success and optimal total R&D investment in the 
economy under cooperative R&D are respectively 





−  and  2
3
) 1 ( 81




− . Therefore, 
expected welfare under cooperative R&D is  
 
81
] ) 1 ( 4 ) 1 ( 16 20 [
2 c c c
Wc
− − − +
= .                                 (22) 
 
                                                       
9 Given these values of a  and c , cooperative R&D is profitable for  ) , 0 ( 5
2 ∈ c .  12
From (21) and (22), we find that  c l W W >  since  0
2
> c . 
So, the above discussions imply that the possibility of endogenous R&D costs 
would modify Proposition 4 in the following way.  
 
Proposition 5: Possibility of licensing is more likely to reduce social welfare if the cost 
reduction from R&D is sufficiently small and the effect of R&D investment on the 
probability of success in R&D is sufficiently low.  
 
6 Conclusion 
In this paper we examine whether the option for licensing is social welfare improving. 
We show that when licensing ex-post R&D is an option then the firms will always do 
non-cooperative R&D keeping the option for licensing open. But, when licensing is not 
an option then the firms will do cooperative R&D when cost reduction from R&D is 
sufficiently small. 
Therefore, if cost reduction from R&D is sufficiently small then firms will do 
non-cooperative R&D when they have the option for licensing afterwards but will do 
cooperative R&D when they do not have the possibility of licensing. Licensing will not 
change the effective marginal cost of production of the licensee compared to no 
licensing. We show that, in this situation, consumer surplus and also social welfare will 
be more under cooperative R&D compared to ‘non-cooperative R&D with the 
possibility of licensing afterwards’. Hence, if cost reduction from R&D is sufficiently 
small then the option for licensing is welfare reducing. 
  If cost reduction from R&D is not sufficiently small then the firms will do non-
cooperative R&D irrespective of the possibility of licensing. Here effective costs of 
production remain same with and without the possibility of licensing. But the possibility 
of royalty payment increases expected profit of the firms when there is a possibility of 
licensing. Thus, in this situation, the option for licensing increases welfare.   
  If the firms can influence probability of success in R&D through their choice of 
R&D investment then the possibility of higher social welfare increases in presence of 
licensing. This is because the expected profit with the presence of licensing induces the 
firms to invest more in R&D, which increases the probability of success in R&D.  
  Therefore, whether presence of licensing increases welfare depends on the cost 
reduction from R&D and the influence of R&D investment on the probability of success 
in R&D. Thus, unlike previous studies, this paper shows that the possibility of licensing 
can reduce welfare even if licensing does not induce firms to exit the market or does not 
facilitate collusion. Hence, while encouraging licensing, an economy should be careful 
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